The low rate of return on grain cultivation and the non-farming farmland are adverse to China"s grain production and management. The government of Taicang City, Jiangsu Province commissioned village collectives to establish collective cooperative farms, which engage in grain production through land transfer. It remains to be further examin whether the new agricultural management model can become an effective way of ensuring food production. This paper deconstructs the collective cooperative farm model under the framework of “Organization Construction-Contract Governance” by taking a typical case from Yong Village, Taicang City. The results show that collective cooperative farms have alleviated the constraints of transaction costs and insufficient coordination incentives in grain production by leveraging the effects of property rights incentives, reducing transaction costs, scale of operation, and specialized division of labor, effectively ensured the quantity and quality of grain production. However, there are certain limitations in the sustainability of endogenous development, guaranteeing the rights and status of contracting parties, and the flow of market resource elements of the collective cooperative farm. It is required comprehensive consideration of regional applicability to apply the experience of collective cooperative farms.