Abstract:Based on field research in S county, province Z, and X county, province H, it was found that the risk-producing behaviour of grass-roots governments mainly manifested itself in the form of exceeding top-down regulations or requirements governing the behaviour of grass-roots governments, with the aim of increasing disposable financial revenue or increasing their control over limited grass-roots finances in order to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand faced by the governments, although this behaviour could increase the likelihood of their being held accountable. This behavior is generated by the dual pressure of fiscal scarcity in the county and the pressure of performance under the horizontal competition structure. Due to the path dependence on "resource-intensive" performance, the government has generated a large number of demands for financial resources, which are difficult to satisfy through the current scarcity of financial resources. In order to limit the risks to a manageable level, the grassroots have turned to risk-avoidance behavioral strategies such as welcoming inspections, maintaining stability, and capturing elites.