风险制造与风险规避:基层政府的行为逻辑*
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湖南长沙 中南大学公共管理学院

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国家社会科学基金青年项目,城乡融合发展视角下农村土地资源整合机制研究,21CSH012


Risk Avoidance and Risk Manufacturing: the Behavioral Logic of Grassroots Government——Based on The Empirical Analysis of X County and S County
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College of Public Administration of Central South University

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    摘要:

    基于Z省S县和H省X县的田野调查发现,基层政府制造风险的行为主要表现为对自上而下规范基层政府行为的规定或要求的逾越,其目的在于增加财政可支配收入或增加对基层有限财政的支配权,以缓解其面临的财政供需矛盾,然而该行为却可能增加其被问责的可能性;该行为生成于县域财政匮乏与横向竞争结构下政绩压力的双重挤压,由于“资源密集型”政绩的路径依赖,政府产生了大量的财政资源诉求,然而这种需求却难以通过当前匮乏的财政资源得到满足;为了将制造的风险限定在可控的范围之内,迎检、维稳和精英俘获都是基层转而采取的风险规避行为策略。

    Abstract:

    Based on field research in S county, province Z, and X county, province H, it was found that the risk-producing behaviour of grass-roots governments mainly manifested itself in the form of exceeding top-down regulations or requirements governing the behaviour of grass-roots governments, with the aim of increasing disposable financial revenue or increasing their control over limited grass-roots finances in order to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand faced by the governments, although this behaviour could increase the likelihood of their being held accountable. This behavior is generated by the dual pressure of fiscal scarcity in the county and the pressure of performance under the horizontal competition structure. Due to the path dependence on "resource-intensive" performance, the government has generated a large number of demands for financial resources, which are difficult to satisfy through the current scarcity of financial resources. In order to limit the risks to a manageable level, the grassroots have turned to risk-avoidance behavioral strategies such as welcoming inspections, maintaining stability, and capturing elites.

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  • 收稿日期:2024-01-09
  • 最后修改日期:2024-05-15
  • 录用日期:2024-06-22
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